US Grand Strategy: China
China will be the toughest geopolitical rival in US history. America is not ready.
This is the China installment in Ad Astra’s American grand strategy for a multipolar world. The series contains 7 white papers: 2 global policies and 5 country-level strategies.
1. Introduction
2. Global trading alliance network
3. China
4. Russia
5. Middle East
6. Mexico
7. India
Signs and signals call for speed -- full speed ahead - FDR, 1940
US grand strategy should be centered around geopolitical competition with China. Despite promises to “pivot to Asia” for more than a decade, America now finds itself distracted and pinned down in hard-to-solve conflicts in Ukraine and Israel. This pleases Beijing. The US should refocus on China, which the Defense Department calls “the only competitor to the United States with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order.”[i]
China and America are currently on track for war, which would be devastating and is a conflict that the US could lose. According to the Thucydides Trap[ii], over the last 500 years a rising power (China) and incumbent great power (America) have gone to war 12 out of 16 times, a 75% rate. To escape history, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US cannot have business as usual relations. The US and its allied bloc must “out run” the PRC instead of trying to “trip” them as current foreign policy is clumsily attempting. Unlike the usual forecasts of a “hundred-year marathon”, America faces the acute threat of a “Peak China” in the 2020s.
Since 1991, the PRC has had remarkable growth, with its economy growing 40x and its military budget increasing 42x. Going forward, there are three possible scenarios for the PRC’s future: 1) continuing its current growth indefinitely (unlikely), 2) moderating growth (China bull case), and 3) fragmentation and collapse (China bear case). Since hope is not a strategy, the US must prepare for scenario 2 where the PRC’s growth moderates, but it is a major geopolitical competitor to the US.
If the PRC became the regional hegemon in Asia, they could set the terms of trade for the most dynamic and fastest growing markets in the world. The PRC could potentially block US imports and exports to other Asian countries, as well as energy supplies from the Middle East. A hostile military alliance in Asia would threaten our security interests. All of these things would negatively impact average Americans, which is why we have a vital US interest in preventing the PRC from becoming a regional hegemon. Therefore, the strategy in future US-PRC relations must be fourfold: 1) sprint through the near-term “danger zone”[1], the point of maximum peril from a peaking China before 2030, 2) lead a global anti-China alliance bloc, 3) deny the Chinese Communist Party’s aggression wherever it manifests while 4) “outrunning” the PRC by eroding its export manufacturing dominance in the long-term.
In the very long-term, it is likely that the PRC’s autocratic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will crumble, but the US must survive the perilous 2020s first and patiently outlast the CCP afterwards. However, some entity will replace the CCP and the US will have to learn to live with a big China in the world. Indeed, it wasn’t until the relatively recent Age of Exploration and Industrial Revolution that the West was more powerful than the East. China is simply reverting to the historical mean.
The US-China competition involves three domains: economic, military, and information. It is essential for the US to contest all three domains. Throughout this paper, each domain will be referred to in various combinations with one another. It is important to recognize the hybrid nature of this competition.
American Jobs
To understand why tensions have risen with the PRC, one only must look at the rusting industrial heart of America (detailed in American Deindustrialization). Offshoring to the PRC took both millions of American jobs and the US industrial base. The PRC cannot be blamed for this. They took advantage of an opportunity and raised millions out of poverty. However, no sovereign nation can rely on another for its essential needs and no great power can maintain its status without an industrial base. Therefore, restoring and maintaining a globally competitive industrial base and the jobs to maintain it should be the fundamental goal of any US policy towards the PRC.
Peak China
History shows that a rapidly rising power who encounters economic stagnation and faces decline, a peaking power, typically will act aggressively while it still can. Imperial Germany did so in 1914, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan did so in WW2, and modern Russia did so after 2008. The last 150 years are replete with examples of this behavior[iii] .
China is in exactly this situation today, facing an economic slowdown and major demographic headwinds (detailed here). Its actions during the COVID-19 pandemic alerted the world to China’s danger and countries are preparing accordingly. As the economy slows, history shows that the CCP will compensate domestically with nationalism and repression. Abroad, as China loses market access to the US, Europe, and Japan, China will respond with economic imperialism and military aggression while it still can. The “danger zone” of a US-China war is before 2030.
Economic warfare
In its race with the PRC, the US has elected to attempt to “trip” China by applying export controls on high-end semiconductors rather than trying to “out run” China. These sanctions have failed and the PRC has instead developed high-end domestic semiconductor capacity. Further sanctions were announced in October 2023, but these too are likely to fail and further incentivize the Chinese semiconductor industry to develop.
Instead, the US should seek to “out run” the PRC and widen its technological lead. Semiconductor supply chain reshoring should be a priority. Deep US capital markets, Silicon Valley, and the venture capital ecosystem are strengths in this race. America should restrict inbound capital into sensitive US investments and outbound capital flows into sensitive Chinese investments. Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China should be ended. China disregards the rules of international trade, restricting access to its own market, distorting foreign markets with subsidies, and stealing intellectual property. The resulting trade imbalances, declining domestic investment, and reduction in production capacity continually harm American industry and workers.[iv] There should be a tariff placed on non-commodity Chinese imports into the US. Firms with significant revenue in the US should also justify material investments into the PRC to US regulators, or lose US market access. This meant to protect American sovereignty and jobs.
Denial Defense
The US needs a strong military presence in Asia to deter any Chinese aggression. America is not seeking a new cold war but the ruthless logic of great power conflict and millennia of lessons from human history shows military strength is the only path to peace. Designers of American force posture should focus on projecting enough power into the Western Pacific to deny the PRC free access to three areas: 1) Taiwan, 2) the South China Sea, and 3) other contested areas in the PRC’s near abroad.
If the PRC attacked Taiwan, as they have repeatedly stated they would do, control of the world’s semiconductor manufacturing would be lost, satellites would be at risk, and a global depression would ensue. But Taiwan is also very strategic real estate. Its occupier can use the Eastern shore to project power into the Pacific and the island is critical to military control of the First Island Chain, the key to naval superiority in the region. To prevent this catastrophe, Taiwan must become a porcupine: unable to be devoured by the PRC.
Figure 1: The First Island Chain[v]
A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) assault on Taiwan might include an amphibious assault across the 100-mile Taiwan Strait. An amphibious landing is an extremely difficult military maneuver if contested by the US, and one that would be extremely bloody (tens of thousands of US servicemembers dead). The US might ultimately lose. That scenario must be avoided through deterrence.
The US should enable Taiwan to immediately create “smart fortifications” along Taiwan’s beaches that could face PRC assault replete with drones, barriers, and other defenses. Doing so would be inexpensive, especially compared to fighting an invasion. The US should also heavily arm Taiwan so they have credible deterrence.
Taiwan is a democracy and some parties are more pro-China than others. The US must not interfere in their internal democratic affairs but must make it clear that the US will only arm and defend Taiwan if certain, anti-China policies are enacted. They include but are not limited to minimum defense spending thresholds and standing army capabilities. The US should also make it clear that if the PRC attacked Taiwan, America would move against other, more accessible, overseas Chinese interests.
The US must also defend Taiwan’s information sphere, which is under constant assault from PRC cyberattacks, psychological warfare, and other cyber affronts.
Second, the US must maintain naval supremacy in the South China Sea. There, the PRC has militarized and made territorial claims within the “nine dash line” that conflict with international law. American allies also claim parts of this area, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. One-third of the world’s trade transits the South China Sea and the region is rich with natural resources. The US Navy’s ability to maintain freedom of navigation in the area is critical to maintaining a robust Pacific defensive alliance and ensuring stable economic growth in the region.
Figure 2: The South China Sea[vi]
Finally, the US must be able to project power into other contested areas in China’s “near abroad”, including but not limited to, the East China Sea, as well as non-territorial domains like space and cyberspace.
Project of the century
The PRC has embarked on the $3 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[vii], which covers the Eurasian supercontinent with a network of roads, rails, ports, and other logistics infrastructure. The BRI has 3 goals: 1) link the markets of Europe to the factories of China, 2) spread the PRC’s geopolitical influence across Eurasia and 3) utilize excess domestic production and construction capacity abroad. Like the Silk Road thousands of years ago, the BRI aims to connect East and West. As with the proposed US grand strategy, the Chinese understand the geopolitical importance of dominating the Eurasian heartland and they’re well on their way with the BRI. Along with the PRC naval buildup, the US must realize the gravity of the threat to the US-led world order.
Pipeline politics
Central Asia, on the PRC’s western border, has vast energy resources that the PRC wants to develop and exploit. Turkmenistan in particular, with 265 trillion cubic feet[viii] of natural gas reserves, has vast energy supplies. It is in America’s interest to ensure the Central Asian states remain independent and do not fall into China’s orbit. Russia is also active in this region and it is an area to drive a wedge between the budding China-Russia axis. Furthermore, Western energy companies should take the lead in developing these resources and construct pipelines to transport Central Asian energy to Western markets.
Figure 3: Central Asian pipelines to China[ix]
Digital authoritarianism
In addition to physical infrastructure, the CCP is erecting formidable digital infrastructure behind the Great Firewall. They have widely deployed social credit scores, government-controlled digital currency, surveillance cameras, and facial recognition technology. To see the end state of this digital authoritarianism, visit Xinjiang, home of the Uyghurs in the west of the country, to see a 21st century police state complete with concentration camps.
The PRC is exporting this technology to autocrats around the world through its national champions like Huawei and ZTE. By creating a PRC-controlled information bloc, not only are other autocrats enabled but the CCP will have a backdoor into societies around the world. The 21st century equivalent of a 20th century spy ring.
The US and its allies should employ “greyzone” cyberattacks short of war behind the Great Firewall to sow confusion and discord. Examples include interrupting CCP censorship, amplifying dissident messages, and probing critical information infrastructure with the intent of letting the CCP know the US can.
Alliance network
The US should develop and maintain a robust anti-China alliance in the Pacific made up of countries with a shared interest in deterring Chinese aggression. A comprehensive defense treaty equivalent to NATO in the Pacific would be nice, but is not essential. Ad hoc defensive groupings like the Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia), AUKUS (Australia, UK, US), and trilateral of the US-South Korea-Japan, among others, are a great start. In general, the alliance network should be as big and encompass as many countries as possible. Special efforts should be made to bring India and Vietnam fully into the alliance – both are hedging their relations with China and the US.
The US-led bloc should stay off of Chinese telecommunications hardware and create an information bloc of its own. This necessitates the rollout of cheap telecommunications technology like 5G that is cost competitive with Chinese equipment. The US and its allies should ban or force a sale of TikTok to a western firm. Not doing so would be granting America’s biggest geopolitical rival unfettered, instant propaganda access to your public. Phones, social media, and websites will be inoperable between the two blocs but the alternative is an expanding digital iron curtain.
The Homefront
America’s posture in the Western Pacific is critical but the US will truly “out run” the PRC on the Homefront. The US needs to mobilize on the scale of WW2. A whole-of-society approach is the only option given America’s population disadvantage (350 million vs. 1.4 billion). This mobilization will promote economic growth and will put the post-2008 malaise and deindustrialization firmly in the past. Among the critical supply chains reshored, the US must bring home the production of basic industrial materials like aluminum and steel processing. It doesn’t make sense to rely on America’s primary geopolitical foe for basic industrial goods.
The competition with the PRC after 2030 is unlikely to be short and it would be a mistake to impatiently deploy overly aggressive policy in hopes of bringing a quick end to the contest. The multidecade marathon is likely to stretch over many Presidential administrations and like the 40-year Cold War, will reshape American power centers and government. This should be viewed as an opportunity to rebuild major institutions, which have suffered from a lack of public trust in the 21st-century.
There is a great risk of PRC aggression in the Taiwan Strait during the 2024 US Presidential election. Imagine the chaos China could sow during the lame duck period between election day in November 2024 and inauguration day in January 2025, particularly if there is a change of Administrations. Therefore, the US should publicly release a bipartisan statement before election day outlining exactly how it would respond to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait to deter any PRC aggression.
Only through strength will the US avoid a kinetic war with the PRC. In the 4 cases where nations “beat” the Thucydides Trap, 2 involved America (US-UK in early 20th century and US-USSR in the Cold War)[x]. The US has a proven track record of promoting peace and prosperity in a dangerous world. The US and the PRC should promote significant people-to-people exchanges, like collocating on space exploration, even as tensions run hot. Our greatest route to avoiding war is through the shared empathy of our peoples.
In conclusion, the United States faces a critical juncture in its grand strategy towards China, the most formidable geopolitical rival it has ever encountered. The urgency of the situation necessitates a multifaceted and proactive approach. America must swiftly pivot its focus from existing conflicts to the looming challenge posed by China, a nation that not only seeks to reshape the international order but is rapidly gaining the capacity to do so. The specter of the Thucydides Trap looms large, with historical precedents underscoring the high likelihood of conflict between a rising and an incumbent power.
The strategies to navigate this complex landscape are clear yet demanding. The US must sprint through the imminent danger zone of the 2020s, leading a global alliance against China's rise while simultaneously bolstering its own domestic capabilities. This involves revitalizing the American industrial base, reshoring critical supply chains, and maintaining military superiority in the Indo-Pacific. The approach must balance firm resistance to China's aggressive tactics with efforts to outrun its economic and technological advancements.
Central to this strategy is the acknowledgment that while the CCP’S autocratic regime may eventually crumble, the US must first endure and outlast them. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate the enduring superiority of the democratic capitalist system over autocracy, safeguarding American interests and values. The path ahead is fraught with challenges, but history has shown that the US possesses the resilience and strategic acumen to navigate such geopolitical waters, emerging stronger and more united in the face of adversity.
1. Introduction
2. Global trading alliance network
3. China
4. Russia
5. Middle East
6. Mexico
7. India
[1] Brands, Hal, and Michael Beckley. Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China. W. W. Norton & Company, 2023.
[i] https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
[ii] Allison, Graham T. Destined for War: Can America and The PRC Escape Thucydides’s Trap? 2017.
[iii] https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/48/1/7/117122/The-Peril-of-Peaking-Powers-Economic-Slowdowns-and
[iv] https://americancompass.org/policy-brief-end-permanent-normal-trade-relations-with-china/
[v] The Economist
[vi] The Economist
[vii] https://www.caixinglobal.com/2023-11-25/weekend-long-read-zhou-xiaochuan-weighs-in-on-the-bri-debate-102139237.html
[viii] US EIA
[ix] https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/gasPipeline.html
[x] Allison, Graham T. Destined for War: Can America and The PRC Escape Thucydides’s Trap? 2017.